A monotone rule is introduced to sum up individual declarations in a multi-variate stopping problem.
Formulation
Let X , n,2: 1, n be p -dimentional random vectors on a probability space ( ~ ,J3, p). The process {X } can be interpreted as a sequence of payoffs to n a group of p players. Each of p players observes sequentially the values of Its distribution is assumed to be known to all of the p players. A player must make a declaration to either "stop" or "continue" on the basis of the observed value at each stage. A group decision whether to stop the process or not is determined by summing up from the individual declarations.
If the group decis:lon is to stop at stage n , then the player i 's net gain is (ii) rr(l,l, ... ,l) = 1.
In this paper a rule does not mean "when to stop the process" but means "how to sum up" the whole players' declarations. The property (ii) is called unanimity in Fishburn [2] .
Its dual property ' TT (0,0, ... ,0) = ° is not needed to be assumed here. A constant function makes the problem trivial because the decision is always to stop from (ii).
The monotone rule has a wide variety in choice systems of our real life.
Some examples for the monotone rule are given as follows. 
P 'TT(in,···,d n )
For instance, a simple majority rule for three players, i.e., ( p,r)=(3,2), is 
, ... , .
In this paper we treat a vector valued expected net gain
and our objective is to find an equilibrium strategy *d E J3' for a given monotone rule ~ The notion of the equilibrium owes to the non-cooperative game theory by Nash [ 6J.
In order to denote a stopping event of the process for a given rule, we need a set-valued function on <f3p( X n ). For 
Clearly two functions 7r and n are related to each other. For example, corresponds to
The stopping event of the process at stage n is denoted by
We note that, if ' TT is monotone, AiC Bi for each i implies
For a given (monotone) rule ' TT , a corresponding set-valued function n is determined only by the union and the intersection of sets.
Next, a one-stage stopping model is considered to clarify a strategy of 
Finite Horizon Case
Consider a finite horizon case restricted by a prescribed number N < co • Our objective is to find an equilibrium strategy for a given monotone rule and determine the associated expected net gain under the situation formulated in the previous section. 
and
even if the corresponding observation cost is negative. 
by backward induction on n.
From tit =N and (2.2), it is trivial for n =N.
Assume that it is true 
Multi-Variate Stopping (Monotone)
By induction, it is equal to
The first term of the right hand side in the above is rewritten as
This implies (2.8) and we have just proved the latter part of the theorem by letting n =1 in (2.8).
Next we must show that, for fixed i,
nd i = . 
. ,*#).

Clearly Nd(i)=*d(i) and °d(i)= *d.
We show (2.10)
for n =1, ... ,N because (2.9) can be proved immediately from (2.10).
By the strategy n d ( i ), it is enough to consider a stopping time tn instead of t .
It is seen that where D n is a stopping event with respect to 
a.n{ i} (V{ i} li) 1 .
P(IT(D , ••• ,n, ... ,zf)lx"Z-)
,
,"Z-= , , ... , p. 
hold where *V = ( *v 1 , ... , *vP) is a solution of (3.1).
By (3.4),
*V is called an equilibrium extected net gain.
proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.3, 5.4 of [5], we omit it here.
Since the For the rest of the section we shall restrict our attention to the case:
Under the assumption (b'), it may happen that the equilibrium stopping time is not finite. But if the assumption (e) should be added, the following corollary must then hold. It is seen in Ex.3.2 that there are cases which satisfy (e). Hereafter we sssume that (a' ) (a) and components of ( xl , ... , X p) are independent. Therefore the solution of (3.1) does not always consist with the equilibrium expected gain in this case.
In order to discuss the associated gain including this case, we simply call an 
This is proved by using a ratio (3.8) as follows. By (a') and (b'), equation He is ranked as an outsider of the game, and his expected gain EXi is the least one. But for l' = P , each player has a veto power and so VIT[p] = sup{ y;P(X>y) > O} Though its stopping time is such that p( tIT[p too) = 1, the associated expected gain is shown to an equilibrium one directly from (1.12), (1.13) and (3.4).
Example 3.2. Let components of random vectors be independent and
identically distributed with a common uniform distribution U(0,1). Table 3.1 shows a numerical example with p = 3 for non-trivial monotone rules. In the first four rules p( t (~d )< 00) = 1, but this does not hold in other cases.
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From (3.5), there exist players who attain the maximum expected gain "unity" in the last four rules. Each expected gain is the 1 imi ting value of the finite horizon case. Except for the 5-th, 6-th and 7-th rule, the value is an equilibrium one by Cor.3.2. 
